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WHO CARES ABOUT COURTS? CREATING 
A CONSTITUENCY FOR JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA 
Mary L. Dudziak* 
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW: FRANCIS NYALALI AND THE ROAD TO 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA. By Jennifer A. Widner. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 2001. Pp. 454. Cloth, $29.95; 
paper, $18.75. 
While American scholars and judges generally assume that it is 
beneficial to insulate courts from politics,1 Jennifer Widner2 offers 
a contrasting perspective from another region of the world. In 
Building the Rule of Law: Francis Nyalali and the Road to Judicial 
Independence in Africa, Widner examines the role of courts and judi­
cial review in democratization in Africa. She focuses on the role of one 
judge, a man who would see himself as embodying a role in Tanzania 
similar to that of Chief Justice John Marshall in the United States. 3 
Francis Nyalali, Chief Justice of the High Court of Tanzania, worked 
to carve out a role for courts in the politics of his nation. He focused 
especially on the importance of public support for the courts, on judi­
cial engagement with political culture, and on creating a constituency 
for judicial review. Creating a public that cared about courts was, for 
Nyalali, an essential component of democratic government. 
* Judge Edward J. and Ruey L. Guirado Professor of Law and History, University of 
Southern California Law School. A.B. 1978, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1984, 
M.A., M.Phil. 1986, Ph.D. 1992, Yale. For helpful comments, I am grateful to Chris Eisgru­
ber, Howard Gillman, and Mark Kende. Thanks to Greg Barchie Rocio Herrera and Re­
becca Lefler for helpful research assistance. 
1. See generally Symposium, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 72 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 311 (1999); see also Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1125-
28 (1977). 
2. Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan. 
3. Francis Nyalali explicitly identified with American Supreme Court Justice John Mar­
shall, and he drew from the American experience to make sense of his own role in Tanzania. 
Nyalali and Marshall both were comparatively young when appointed to their positions. 
Both faced the challenge of institution building, of crafting legal institutions and a culture 
that would support a judiciary and judicial review. Pp. 34, 98-99, 139. On Chief Justice John 
Marshall, see CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND 
THE RULE OF LAW (1996); R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE 
OF THE SUPREME COURT (2002); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A 
NATION (1996); G. EDWARD WHITE WITH GERALD GUNTHER, THE MARSHALL COURT 
AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835 (1988). 
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Widner, an African politics scholar, focuses on the development of 
the judiciary within common law Africa,4 especially Tanzania. Yet in 
constructing this narrative, she writes from a perspective sensitive to 
the ideas and assumptions held by U.S. scholars about American law 
and legal institutions. As a result, she often frames points by placing 
them within the context of ideas about the law prevalent in American 
scholarship. What results is a narrative about Africa that opens up new 
perspectives on legal institutions in general, including legal institutions 
in the United States; 
This Review first examines Widner's depiction of Nyalali's role in 
Tanzania. It then turns to the questions of how this African example 
can shed light on debates about courts in the United States and other 
nations. In particular, this essay argues that the example of Nyalali 
raises questions about the downsides of American assumptions about 
virtues of judicial disengagement. 
* * * * * 
Widner provides an interior view on institutional development by 
telling the story of courts in Africa through the professional life of 
Chief Justice Francis Nyalali. What drives this narrative, however, is 
not the complex texture of one individual's life, the conventional sub­
ject of biography. It is a judicial biography of a different sort - a biog­
raphy of the institution of the judiciary in a region of the world under­
going institutional change. Nyalali served as chief justice of Tanzania's 
highest court from 1976 to 2000, and he led the Tanzanian judiciary 
through a crucial period of institution building. As Widner sees it, 
"[h]is experiences provide a window for understanding the interaction 
between judges, politicians, and publics throughout the African region 
and the consequences for judicial independence and the rule of law" 
(p. 38). 
Widner sets this story within the context of the role of judicial 
independence and the rule of law in other developing areas of 
the world. In earlier years, she suggests, "many people in developing 
countries either considered courts to be the agents of political leaders 
or thought them frail, without the power of the sword or the power of 
the purse behind them." By the end of the twentieth century, however, 
"infringements of judicial independence . . .  [generated] street protests 
as well as foreign censure. The public relationship to the judiciary 
appeared to have changed and with it, the institutional position of 
courts and law" (p. 24). 
4. Widner identifies common law Eastern and Southern Africa as the nations of 
Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, and Lesotho. P. 19. 
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Was this idea of judging a Western value being awkwardly 
imposed on Africa?5 In Nyalali's view, it was a universal democratic 
value, and it was an African value. "[I]ndependence of the judiciary, 
impartiality of adjudication, fairness of trial, and integrity of the 
adjudicator are so universally accepted that one may reasonably 
conclude that these principles are inherent to any justice system in a 
democracy," he argued. "[T]here is no doubt that these same princi­
ples are part of the African dream, resulting from the liberation 
struggle against colonial and racial oppression . . . .  They are inherent 
to the statehood which came into being when our respective countries 
became politically independent" (pp. 29-30; internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
A driving force of Nyalali's role as a judge was to carve out an 
effective role for the courts in the life of his country. The challenges he 
faced are illustrated by a political crisis that developed five years into 
his tenure as Chief Justice. In the early 1980s, in the midst of an 
economic and political crisis in Tanzania, the government cracked 
down on corruption by passing an "Economic Sabotage Act" that not 
only defined a class of economic. crimes, but placed their prosecution 
outside the purview of the judiciary. Those accused of economic 
sabotage were not entitled to bail or to legal representation. They 
were to be tried before a ·tribunal that did not follow the rules of 
evidence and procedure that governed the regular Tanzanian courts 
(p. 144). How should the nation's highest judicial officer respond to 
this challenge to judicial authority? "Suddenly I had to ask myself 
whether I should continue as chief justice or resign," Nyalali later 
recalled. "How. could I continue to preside over the courts when it was 
declared a matter of policy to bypass the judiciary?" (p. 145). 
The difficulty Nyalali faced is one that has confronted other judges 
in other regimes. What should a judge do when she finds herself 
presiding in a system that is itself unjust? Is it best to resign so as not 
to confer legitimacy on an illegitimate system? Or is it better to stay 
on, and to ameliorate the system's faults to the extent she can? Francis 
Nyalali faced this question, but he did not choose between leaving or 
staying. He chose instead a third path. He took his case to the political 
process. In their efforts to fight corruption, he argued, Tanzanian 
lawmakers were themselves being lawless. In a speech before the 
National Executive Committee of Tanzania's state party, Nyalali 
insisted that "no one however high or low is above the law" (p. 151). 
Although criticized by some as a "stooge of imperialism," Nyalali 
gained the support of President Julius Nyerere, and ultimately the 
legislature passed a resolution supporting the rule of law (pp. 150-51). 
5. For an argument that current democratization efforts in Africa are based on ideas 
about the state that stem from a Western capitalist world view, not from African traditions, 
see CLAUDE AKE, THE FEASIBILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (2000). 
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Through this story Widner illuminates the role of judges as strategic 
political actors. And the focus of strategic politics in this story is the 
courts themselves. Nyalali acted politically to generate a constituency 
for judicial review. 
Reform was not a matter of gradual evolution. Instead, Nyalali had 
to capitalize on moments when change could be accomplished. Some­
times there were "openings" when institution building was possible. 6 
One such moment for Tanzania was the crisis precipitated by the 
Economic Sabotage Act. In that context, several matters converged, 
creating an opportunity for judges to "renegotiate the relationship 
between branches and engage in institution building" (p. 151). There 
was an economic crisis, coupled with pressure for reform from foreign 
aid agencies. This coincided with concerns about loss of control on the 
part of political leaders, and with the President's impending retirement 
and his concern with the image of his leadership. This confluence of 
factors, Widner argues, created an "opening," but whether the 
opportunity would lead to meaningful reform depended on Nyalali 
and his judicial colleagues (p. 151 ). "Openings" in other nations would 
not always be taken advantage of, and when there was no crisis, no 
"opening," there was also no institution building. 
When moments of crisis created an opening conducive to change, 
what factors influenced whether reform took place? Widner makes the 
interesting argument that the "capacity to use this new political space 
to build stronger judicial institutions was intricately bound up in the 
character of substantive law" (p. 155). Her focus is on the role of 
public opinion in judicial institution building, and on the way substan­
tive legal developments helped create a constituency, or a culture, 
supportive of judicial review. According to Widner: 
Courts could function effectively and independently, but still fail to win 
the public affection that is important as a long-term protection against 
encroachment. ... The content or substance of the Jaw, as well as the in­
terpretive strategies judges employed in their work, could enhance or 
impede �he bid to invigorate the separation of powers. (p. 155) 
The crisis that created an opening for a politics in support of a rule of 
law, Widner argues, led to new support for individual rights. 
While bills of rights were adopted in many African countries at 
independence, the Tanzanian independence constitution had none. 
Yet in the years before foreign donors promoted rights as conducive to 
economic development, Widner argues that a "home grown" 
interest in rights developed in Tanzania. A combination of interna­
tional developments within Africa and domestic politics Jed to the 
creation of a Tanzanian Bill of Rights and Duties. Adopted as an 
6. For an elaboration of this idea in the American context, see generally BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991), and BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). 
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amendment to the Tanzanian Constitution in 1984, the Bill of Rights 
and Duties protected equality rights, and rights to "life; freedom from 
torture and inhumane or degrading treatment; to the presumption 
of innocence; to a fair hearing by a court of law or other body; to 
freedom of speech, religion, and association," among others (p. 169). 
The rights were subject to limitations. For example, rights were not to 
be exercised "in such a manner as to occasion the infringement or 
termination of the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest" 
(p. 169). The juxtaposition of rights and limitations meant that the 
actual scope of enforceable rights would depend on the courts. The 
amendment also outlined duties of the individual to society: the 
duty to work, the duty to abide by law, the duty to safeguard public 
property, and the duty "to defend, protect and promote national 
independence" (p. 170). These new provisions were subject to a three­
year grace period to enable lawmakers to modify statutes if needed 
before the new rights went into effect. 
How would the new Bill of Rights and Duties affect judicial 
independence in Tanzania? Some judges hoped to capitalize on this 
development. They believed that cases enforcing individual rights 
would strengthen the courts' independence from other branches and 
would enhance the courts' legitimacy. Others felt that individual rights 
enforcement by the courts would place the courts in conflict with the 
legislative and executive branches, ultimately undermining judicial 
independence. In a speech before the law faculty of the University 
of Dar es Salaam, Nyalali addressed the concern that judicial inde­
pendence would be impaired. He tried to put down the "doubts and 
darkness" that gripped the legal profession after the constitutio.nal 
amendment had passed (p. 173; internal quotation marks omitted). He 
also spoke to the question of whether the limitations clauses would 
undermine the effectiveness of the nation's new rights. Drawing from 
constitutional case law in India, Nyalali argued that limitations clauses 
must be read in a way that did not derogate individual rights. 
"Together, not individually," such principles "form the core of the 
constitution," he argued. "Together, not individually, they constitute 
its true conscience." In interpreting constitutional rights and duties, 
"the spirit of the constitution is made to speak loudly and clearly in the 
provisions" (p. 175). 
Nyalali's sense of the nature of the "spirit of the constitution" 
would become clear as the court took up the question of the nature of 
constitutional interpretation. According to Widner, a need to gain 
public acceptance to enhance judicial legitimacy affected strategies of 
interpretation. Widner describes the beginnings in the mid-1980s and 
'90s of "a new jurisprudence that took account of the sharp divisions 
of opinion that existed in [the] country and allowed the court to build 
institutional legitimacy" (p. 179). As Justice Nyalali put it, "If the law 
is to have roots in the hearts and minds of the people of our own 
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country, we must articulate it upon principles which have been tested 
or enunciated in our own history" (p. 181; internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
To inform his interpretation of the Bill of Rights and Duties with 
Tanzanian history, Nyalali turned to the writings of nationalists from 
the independence era. The values underlying the Tanzanian constitu­
tional order were not new, Nyalali argued. "These principles and 
values were articulated on African soil by the great leaders of modern 
Africa" (p. 181). In turning to the past, Nyalali did not invoke the 
narrow conceptions of history that sometimes inform constitutional 
interpretation, such as the idea of the "intent of the framers."7 Instead, 
Nyalali looked more broadly to Tanzanian political culture at the time 
the new nation, and its legal institutions, were created. The values that 
informed Tanzanian constitutionalism, he argued, "are the principles 
and values which underlay the African liberation struggle and gave 
birth to our nationhood" (p. 181). Moreover, the history of Tanzania, 
Nyalali argued, "is a history of the internalization of the principles and 
values of a world-wide liberation movement" (p. 183). 
In later years, through his efforts to engage the public, Nyalali 
would find himself even more fully at the center of Tanzanian 
politics. At one moment, his role in Tanzania came perilously close to 
obliterating the separation of powers he had so diligently championed. 
Tanzania had a one-party government until the early 1990s. In 1991, 
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi assembled a commission to consider 
changing to a multiparty system. In need of a respected person to chair 
this important commission, the president turned to Nyalali. This 
placed the Chief Justice in a difficult position. Nyalali supported the 
move to a multiparty system, but worried that serving on the commis­
sion could undermine the independence of the judiciary. He ultimately 
served on the commission, which recommended that the country move 
to political pluralism. Three years later, Tanzania had its first multi­
party election. Nyalali found himself in an even more awkward 
position when the major parties· approached him about running for 
president. However, as Widner sees it, Nyalali's ambition was not for 
power per se, but for judicial power; his ambition was not for judicial 
supremacy, but instead for the authority that would facilitate judicial 
independence. He declined the call to stand for election. 
The struggle for a multiparty system ultimately enhanced the role 
of the judiciary in Tanzania. Here, again, Widner stresses the impor-
7. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SE­
DUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (1988). See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTI­
TUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1999); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
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tance of public opinion in creating a political culture within which an 
independent judiciary might flourish. Following Tanzania's multiparty 
elections, the courts had the responsibility of hearing petitions about 
election disputes. Hearings on the petitions attracted so much public 
interest that, according to Nyalali, "[i]n some places, we had to set up 
loudspeakers outside the courtroom, in trees, because there was not 
enough space in the courtrooms for all the people who wanted to 
attend" (p. 310). The court, Widner concluded, "had become a center 
for deliberation and public education about democratic norms. It had 
also found a new set of constituents in the men and women who 
sought to run for office on fair terms" (p. 310). While judicial 
independence is often seen as a measure of democratization in Africa,8 
Widner helps us to see that courts are themselves sites for democrati­
zation. Courts themselves can enhance the development of a demo­
cratic political culture. In this sense, the judiciary is not only reflective 
of democracy, but constitutive of it. 
In developing a constituency for courts in Africa, the substantive 
area of law that Widner finds to be of most importance is family law. 
"Some day," she suggests, "judges and lawyers might look back on the 
end of the twentieth century and say that the cases that had contrib­
uted most to law development in this period were not those that 
concerned political liberties but those that were about gender and 
family" (p. 335). Nyalali hoped that women especially "would turn to 
the courts for help in resolving conflicts" (p. 335). According to 
Widner, he believed that "there was no better way to draw African 
principles into the common law and to begin to build an understanding 
of constitutional norms than to support judicial development of family 
law" (p. 335). 
The importance of family law in Africa stems in part from high 
rates of urbanization, which did not sever kinship relationships, but 
complicated them. Mortality from AIDS and civil conflict also 
"scrambled the conventional division of labor, as well as norms 
governing succession and inheritance. Yet women's participation in 
the family, community, and economy was often restricted in ways that 
impeded adaptation to changed new circumstances" (p. 336). When 
African women went to court, they "appealed to principles in the 
common law or to the antidiscrimination clauses in new constitutions 
and international covenants" (p. 338). Their cases presented a 
challenge for courts, as most African constitutions both forbade 
8. See, e.g., Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A 
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysl�. 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (1996); Jennifer Widner, 
Courts and Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social Scientist's Perspective on the 
African Case, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 64 (2001). For a critique of current democratization efforts, 
see AKE, supra note 5. 
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discrimination against women and mandated respect for customary 
law, which restricted women's role. 
While Widner effectively ·makes the case for the importance of 
gender to the clash between customary and constitutional law, this is­
sue does not fit neatly within the focus of her narrative: Nyalali's 
experience as a window into the development of judicial independ­
ence. Her most illuminating examples come not from Tanzania, but 
from Botswana and Zimbabwe. This underscores an awkward feature 
of Widner's use of one person's story when at times she wishes to 
illuminate judicial development in a region. In the Tanzanian family 
law case, the court ruled in favor of an appellant who argued that 
a woman's attempt to sell property violated customary law that 
disallowed women from disposing of clan property. In rejecting the 
woman's constitutional arguments, Nyalali's opinion noted that the 
new Bill of Rights did not yet apply to such claims, since the three­
year grace period had not yet lapsed. His opinion emphasized, 
however, that the court had ruled previously that customary law had 
no exceptional status, so that claims like the one at issue might be 
heard in the future. So although he did not take up the substantive 
issue of sex discrimination in this case, he did make it clear that 
customary law would be subject to constitutional review (pp. 359-60). 
* * * * * 
Can a book on courts in Africa inform legal scholarship in 
America? In recent years, as law schools have taken up the question of 
the impact of globalization on the practice of law, interest in the law 
and the courts in other nations has increased. The traditional focus 
of comparative law in the United States has been on comparing 
American law with the law of European nations. 9 Recent scholarship 
has encompassed more of the globe, 10 and important work has focused 
9. Some doubt that comparative Jaw has significant value unless the systems being com­
pared have certain cultural similarities. See Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court 2001 Term -
Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 16, 113 (2002) ("[I]nterpretive inspiration is only proper if there is an ideological basis 
common to the two legal systems and a common allegiance to basic democratic principles."); 
P. G. Monateri, "Everybody's Talking": The Future of Comparative Law, 21 HASTINGS INT'L 
& COMP. L. REV. 825, 826 (1998) ("Culture (and the differences between them) has always 
been a central concern of comparative law, and the first step of the conventional approach is 
to divide the legal world into families by tracing back common roots, as genealogies to ex­
plain the present. Genealogies define who we think we are or would like to think we are. 
They define an 'us' and a 'them,' and they are an essential mechanism of how identities are 
constructed."). Additionally, "(f]or the past half century, comparative law in the United 
States has been led by the generation of emigres who fled Hitler's Europe to become profes­
sors of comparative Jaw," which has influenced the focus of comparative legal scholarship. 
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Compara­
tive Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 43-44 (1998). 
10. See, e.g., Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race Ideology in 
the Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Laws, a United States-Latin America Comparison, 87 
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on South Africa. 1  What of the rest of the continent of Africa? Amidst 
the blossoming of comparative scholarship, most of the continent 
of Africa is usually overlooked, as if it were a legal "Heart of 
Darkness,"12 as if it were a lawless world. How could such a world 
offer lessons for our own? Although there was a flurry of interest 
during the independence years, Africa has remained largely off the 
agenda of American legal scholarship.13 
American lawyers embraced Africa in the 1960s. Before the 
current generation of American legal scholars who have advised other 
nations about constitutional development, American lawyers went to 
Africa to counsel nations emerging from colonialism about constitu­
tions, courts, and legal education.14 A number of American law 
CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2002); Kwang-Rok Kim, The Tender Offer in Korea: An Analytic 
Comparison Between Korea and the United States, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 497 (2001); 
Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: 
Lessons from the Prewar Japanese Cotton Textile Industry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 171 (2000); 
Chester S. Spell, The Evolution of Rights Disputes and Grievance Procedures: A Comparison 
of New Zealand and The U.S., 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 199 (1997); Craig P. Wagnild, Civil Law 
Discovery in Japan: A Comparison of Japanese and U.S. Methods of Evidence Collection in 
Civil Litigation, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. l (2002). 
11. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST APARTHEID, 1980-1994 (1995); KENNETH S. BROUN, BLACK LAWYERS, WHITE 
COURTS: THE SOUL OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW (2000); STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF 
TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY (1992); HEINZ 
KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM, AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL 
RECONSTRUCTION (2000). An important focus of comparative work has been on race rela­
tions in the U.S. and South Africa. See JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE 
SUPREMACY: THE ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AMERICAN 
SOUTH (1982); GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981); see also Mark s. Kende, Gender 
Stereotypes in South African and American Constitutional Law: The Advantages of a Prag­
matic Approach to Equality and Transformation, 117 S. AFR. L.J. 745 (2000). 
12. See JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS (1902); see also BILL BERKELEY, THE 
GRAVES ARE NOT YET FULL: RACE, TRIBE, AND POWER IN THE HEART OF AFRICA 7 
(2001) (criticizing "the conventional American conception of Africa as a unitary landscape 
of unremitting despair"). 
13. There are, of course, exceptions to this trend. See, e.g., Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy 
E. Higgins, Promise Unfulfilled: Law, Culture, and Women's Inheritance Rights in Ghana, 25 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (2001); James Thuo Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms: Ex­
panding the Promises and Possibilities of the Rule of Law as an Anti-Corruption Strategy in 
Kenya, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 407 (1999); Minasse Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its 
Impact Upon Unity, Human Rights, and Development, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1 
(1996); Richard A. Rosen, Constitutional Process, Constitutionalism, and the Eritrean Experi­
ence, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 263 (1999); Annmarie M. Terraciano, Contesting 
Land, Contesting Laws: Tenure Reform and Ethnic Conflict in Niger, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 723 (1998); Adrien Katherine Wing, Communitarianism v. Individualism: Constitu­
tionalism in Namibia & South Africa, 11 WIS. INT'L L.J. 295 (1993). 
14. Aspects of this story will be explored in KEVIN GAINES, FROM BLACK POWER TO 
CIVIL RIGHTS: AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPATRIATES IN NKRUMAH'S GHANA, 1957-1966 
(forthcoming); and Mary L. Dudziak, Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood Marshall and 
the Constitution of Kenya (Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See 
also PAUL L. EDENFIELD, THE AMERICAN HEARTBREAK: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF 
PAULI MURRAY (Robert Crown Law Library, Stanford Law School, Women's Legal History 
Biography Project, Autumn 2002), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/WLHP/ 
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teachers taught law in Africa. 15 Because there were very few indige­
nous African lawyers in most nations immediately after independence, 
building a legal profession in African countries was an aspect of nation 
building. 
One of the many contributions of Widner's very rich book is that 
she traces the history of the engagement of American lawyers and 
legal academics with Africa, from the earlier "law and development" 
movement, through its demise, and to the current involvement of 
American lawyers and scholars in Africa. During the independence 
era, foundations and government agencies supported the development 
of legal institutions and education in Africa. Idealistic Americans went 
to Africa to aid new African governments. This movement was short­
lived, however, as law came to be seen in Africa as a neocolonial in­
strument. Law was thought to "serve the interests of state authorities 
and social engineers. It had lost its status as a source of norms that 
could help define appropriate limits on the use of political power."16 
Law reform would be back on the agenda of international aid agencies 
by the 1990s, "responding to the 'pull' of African judges like Nyalali 
and the 'push' of their own policy makers" (p. 207). Law reform was 
now thought to aid democratization and to create a better climate for 
economic growth. 
The issue at the heart of this study, the idea of judges as strategic 
political actors, is both familiar to scholars in the United States, and 
for some, an anathema. 17 However, the picture of judges and politics 
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that emerges from scholarship on United States courts is different 
from the sort of intersection between courts and politics in Widner's 
book. For example, following the 2000 election, scholars debated 
whether the United States Supreme Court had been partisan in its 
decision in Bush v. Gore.18 More frequently, the Court is seen as 
supporting the interests of particular social classes,19 or as championing 
a liberal or conservative ideology. 2 0  Judicial politics is discussed in 
terms of the substantive values judges support. 
The fictional character Mr. Dooley famously said that "th' supreme 
court follows th' illiction returns,''21 and scholars often argue that the 
United States Supreme Court is careful not to move too far beyond 
public opinion, lest it damage its legitimacy. 2 2  In this sense, public 
opinion is seen as a boundary constraining the scope of judicial action. 
This conception of political culture as a boundary is different, and 
more limited, than Nyalali's proactive engagement. 
The notion of courts reaching out to the public runs directly 
contrary to some American perspectives on the judicial role. Most 
prominently, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has decried the 
idea that courts should have regard for public opinion, suggesting that 
it is important for the Supreme Court to ignore it. He has said: "I don't 
know what the most profoundly held beliefs of the American people 
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are. I don't go to the neighborhood pub and raise a glass with Joe Six­
pack. " 2 3  When the United States Supreme Court considered abortion 
rights in the 1989 case Webster v. · Reproductive Health 
Services, Scalia suggested that the Court should not be "the object of 
the sort of organized public pressure that political institutions in a 
democracy ought to receive." 2 4  Scalia reiterated his concern about 
public engagement with the Court in another abortion case, Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey in 1992. "How upsetting it is," he complained, 
"that so many of our citizens (good people, not lawless ones, on both 
sides of the abortion issue, and on various of other issues as well) think 
that we Justices should properly take into account their views, as 
though we were engaged not in ascertaining an objective law but in 
determining some kind of social consensus. " 2 5  This argument for 
disengagement is consistent with Scalia's theory of law and interpreta­
tion. 2 6 Because, for Scalia, law stands apart from culture, rather than 
being constructed by it, the rule of law depends upon insulation rather 
than engagement. In contrast, for Nyalali, a rule of law requires judi­
cial engagement with political culture. Engagement does not under­
mine the rule of law, but enhances it by fostering a culture supportive 
of judicial review. In this sense, Nyalali sees law and culture as 
mutually constitutive,27 while Scalia views them as separate spheres 
that must not commingle. In this way, Building a Rule of Law helps us 
to broaden our conception of the relationship between courts and poli­
tics. It also helps us to take seriously the question of whether the Joe 
and Jane "Six-packs" of the world should be very much on the agenda 
of courts interested in maintaining their own legitimacy. 
* * * * * 
Jennifer Widner's fascinating study of courts and politics in Africa 
helps us reflect on courts and politics in the United States. As the 
United States Supreme Court has undergone an ideological shift to the 
right in the late twentieth century, affecting the nature of individual 
rights and the scope of congressional power, some scholars have ar­
gued for a turn away from the courts. They advocate "populist 
constitutionalism," or an emphasis on the constitution outside the 
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courts. 28 While this scholarly move is a helpful corrective in its empha­
sis that the judiciary is not the only locus of constitutional analysis, it 
may also deflect political debate from a focus on the role of the judici­
ary itself. If courts are constitutive of popular democracy, rather than 
simply a reflection of it, then even populists must engage the courts 
since the courts play a role in constructing political culture. 
At this moment in the history of American courts, it may be 
helpful to reflect on the lesson Widner offers about Tanzania. In a 
democracy, judicial legitimacy and authority ultimately flow from a 
public, from a culture, supportive of judicial review. 2 9 And as we can 
see in this example from Africa, support for the courts can depend on 
the very nature of judicial action. The courts and the people together 
worked to build a rule of law in Tanzania premised on the idea that 
the courts play a central role in a democracy: the protection of indi­
vidual rights against government tyranny. 
In this sense, perhaps, Francis Nyalali also has a lesson for popular 
constitutionalism. He emphasizes a public conception, a political 
culture, not just on the nature of rights, but also on the role of courts 
in a democracy. And so, paradoxically, the popular constitutionalism 
we see in Building the Rule of Law is not only a popular constitutional 
vision about rights. It is also a popular vision of the importance of 
courts. How interesting that as African nations embrace judicial 
review, there is less consensus among American scholars that it 
matters to care about courts. 
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